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ABSTRACT 
Recent developments using direc.ted a.C"yclical graphs (i .e., influence diagrams and 
Bayesian networks) for knowledge representation have lessened the problems of using 
probability in knowledge-based systems (KBS). 11ost current research involves the 
efficient propagation of new evidenee, but, lit.tle has been done concerning the maint.e­
nance of domain-specific knowledge, which includes the probabilistic information about 
the problem domain. By making use of conditional independencies represented in the 
graphs, however, probability assessments are required only for certain variables when 
the knowledge base is updated. 
The purpose of this study was to invest.igate, for those variables which require 
probability assessments, ways to reduce the amount of new knowledge required from. 
the expert when updating probabilistic information in a probabilistic knowledge- based 
system. Three special .cases (ignored outcome, split. out<'ome, and assumed con:;t.a.nt 
outcome) were identified under which many of the onginal probabilities (t.hose already 
in the knowledge-base) do not need to be reas:;essed when maintenance is required. 
Introduction 
Just as with rule-based systems, t.he general domain knowledge of probabilistic 
knowledge-based systems i.'l not static. The KBS must be changed to reflect the 
changed state of information when new t.est.s fo1· existing hypotheses are developed, new 
hypotheses are formed , or a more t.horough und(•rstanding of t.he problem domain is 
gained. \Vhen determined that the KBS model represent.ecl in the influence diagram is 
no longer adequate, the knowledge engineer's first ta.sk is the reassessment of the nodes 
and their dependencies. Nodes may lw ;ulded Ol' delet.ed, outcome spaces for individual 
variables may increase or decrease. <�rcs may be added or deleted, or the probability cris­
tributions for a variable's outeonws 1na,v lw c·ha.nged. Because of the local modularity 
property, the only probability d ist.ribu t.ions t.hat must be re-encoded are those associ­
ated with nodes that. have had som(• c·hanil,'c� made• t.o their outcome space (gaining, los­
ing, or changing outcomes) or incoming ar<'s (gnining or losing an incoming arc, or hav­
ing the outcome space of a conditioning ,-,uia.ble modified) (Beckerman & Horvitz:125). 
In systems where the dept'ndeney struct-ure changes infrequently, the time and 
effort required to encode the new distribut.ions may be relatively insignificant. However, 
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as these systems are applied to pwblem do mai ns which are highly dynamic, i.e., the 
dependencies and probabilities often change. a significantly larger port ion of time will 
be spent encoding probabilities. This paper examines ways in whkh the probabilistic 
information can change and possible means t.o reduce the effort requi1·ed in the en coding 
process. 
What Happens When the State of Information Changes'? 
When the state of information changes, the dependency structure for the influence 
diagram. must be reassessed and those nodes which experience a change in their incom­
ing arcs or outcome space must be reassessed. The more nodes that experience such 
changes, the more information that must be en coded from the expert. At the very 
least, probabilistic information must be encoded for the new outcomes and new vari­
ables. Also, any data invalidated· by the change in the state of information must be 
re�essed, even if the dependency struct.UJ'e did not change. However , all is not neces­
sar ily lost. There may be some circumst.an<�es under which all, or n early all, of the ori­
ginal probabilistic information is still va.lid. Some of these circumstances are identified 
in the following sections as special cases which may apply for some state of information 
changes. 
Special Cases for Marginal and Co!ldilioual Probability Distributions 
As indicated by Pearl, Shach ter , and others, information from experts is more 
easily gathered in the form of marginal and conditional distributions (2:5; 3:246; 4:.55). 
Since information is primarily collected in this manner, it makes sense to examine possi­
ble effort-saving special cases from this perspec tive . The primary objective is to keep as 
many of the original probabilit ies as possible relevan t under t he new state of informa­
tion. 
Special cases based on the marginal and conditional distributions can be readily 
grouped into ihose applic able when: 1) t.he outcome space for a variable changes in size: 
2) a. variable is added or removed from the inliuence diagram; and 3) an arc between 
two nodes is added or removed, changing the conditioning information in the diagram. 
The only other change which indicates a new state of information is when underlyin g 
probabilities change. No special cases were found to reduce the number of assessments 
required in response to this type ol' chan ge. 
· 
For each special case, we examine, the effects on the node being changed (either a 
node experiencing a change in it1>1 out.('Otnt' s!Jac·f'. o1· a new, added node) and on nodes 
whose incoming arcs are somehow modified (either by a change in the outcome space of 
a conditional predec essor, or by the addition or loss of conditional predecessors). Since 
exponential growth can occur, these special cases w ere developed primar ily with an 
expansi on of the outcome space or n umber of varia.bles in mind. 
Changes in the Outcome Space. When the new state of information changes a 
node's outcome space, the probability distribution for that node must be reassessed. 
The distribution of any other nodes which were previously , or are now, conditioned on 
the changed node must also be •·eassessed. Two special cases, the "ignored outcome'' 
and the "split outcome", may reduce the nutnb(•r of assessments required. 
Ignored Outcome Special Case. In terest in the first spec ial case was motivat.ed 
by the following quest ion : if a new, or previously "forg otte n " outcome was added to a 
node, under what conditions would t.he original pl'obabilistic information be of use? For 
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this case, the original outcome space fo1· the changed variable would be mutually 
exclusive but not collectively exhaustive. 
Let A. be a node with m outcomes under the original state of information. & . 
Now the expe �t perceives· a previously ignored outcome, am+l· This new knowledge 
(that outcome am+l exists) indicates a change in the state of information, aJld the 
diagram must be reassessed relative to this new sta te of information, &1 • If the expert 
determines that th e old p ro bability distribution for A, given the conditional predeces­
sors C(A ), is 
{1) 
then the new probabilities for the original ou t.comes of A. are given by 
P[A=ai I Cj(A),&' ] = >..i * P[A=ai ICj(A),&] i = 1, . . . , m (2) 
i = 1, . . . . , II I�Y II 
X E C(A) 
where 1�¥11 denotes the number of outcomes for variable X and >..j is a scaling factor for 
the probability distribution of A given the old state of information and a specific com­
bination, indexed by the subscript j, of the outcomes for variables in C (A ), and is 
�@� 
• 
>..j = 1-P [A =am+l I Cj(A ),&' ] 
= P [A :rfam+l I Cj(A. ),&'] 
(3) 
When considering the addition of k new outcomes (instead of just one), the pri­
mary difference is in the calculation of the >..j. 
m+k 
'Ai =l- � P[A=aiiCi(A),&'] 
i-m+l 
This means, for the expanded variable A, only conditional probabilities for the new 
outcomes must be encoded. Once these are obtained, a >..i for each combination of out­
comes of C(A) can be computed directly, and the probabilities under & for the origi­
nal outcomes are given by Eq (2). 
The reduction in the required number of encoclings depends on the number of old 
(m) and new (k) outcomes for A, the number of conditional predecessors for A. 
( IIC(A )10, and the number of out.comes for each predecessor. For comparative pur­
poses, suppose that each conditional predecessOI' of A has n outcomes1. Then the 
number of encodings needed to determine A's clist;ribution in the general case is 
(m+k-l)Xnlle(A)II, since probabilities for a.ll but one of the A's m+k outcomes are 
1This supposition is only made for notational wnv•.·niP.nee. All res11lts remain valid when the nuruber of outcomes 
is allowed to vary for each conditional predeeessor, but t.he number of combinations or those out.comes is calculatP.d 
differently. 
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needed for each combination of the outcomes in C(A. ). Similarly, the number of 
required probability assessments for the ignored outcome special case is just kXn IIC!-4 lll, 
because only the probabilities for the new outcomes of A are needed. 
A similar reduction can be found in the number of probability assessments for 
direct successors of nodes with increased outcome spaces. The applicability of the spe­
cial case must be assessed for each direct successor node individually. \Vhen the proba­
bility distribution for B, a direct successor of A. under the new state of information 
&' , is given by 
P[B=bj IA=ai,C(B),&') = P!B=bj lA =ai,C(B),&] i=l, . . . , m (5) 
then the only conditional distributions which- m ust be assessed for B are those which 
are conditioned on am+V ... , am+k, the new outcomes of A. This means the original 
distributions for iJ are still valid under the new state of information. 
The number of probability a:ssessmenr.s required to determine B's distribution 
depends on m, k, the number of outcomes for B (p ) , ·and the number of outcomes for 
each of the variables in C(B)\A2. For the general case, (m+k)X(p-l)Xnlle!B )\A II pro­
bability assessments are needed. This is reduced to kX(p-l)XniiC(B )\.411 when this spe­
cial case applies. 
Figures l.a and l.b show a graphical comparison of the relative number of assess­
ments required in the general case and the num'ber required in the ignored outcome 
case. 
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Figure 1. Ignored Outcome Versus General Case Data Requirements 
When Expanding .4 by k Outcomes 
For each indicated value of m. the curves show t.he ratio of the number of assess­
ments required for the special case to the number required in the general case. 'f.his 
ratio is . � for Figure l.a, and -.k '· for Figure l.b. If A originally has two out-m+ -1 m+,; 
comes, then gains another due to a change in t.he state of information, Figure l.a shows 
20 (B) \A denotes the set of all conditional predecessors of B, excluding A . 
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that the special case requires 1/2 as many probabilit.y assessments as the general case to 
determine the distribution for A. and Figure l.b shows that only 1/3 as many are 
needed to determine the distribution for B. 
Notice that as the number of new outcomes increases. the relative effectiveness of 
the special case decreases. Convei·sely. as m increases, the relative effectiveness of the 
special case increases. Both of these re flect that the effectiveness of the special case 
depends on the amount of growth relat.ive to the amount of data for the given distribu­
tion in the original influence diagram. 
Split Outcome Special Case. A similar special case exists for situations where 
an outcome of a variable, say A. is split i1Ho t.wo or more distinct outcomes. In effect. 
the original outcome, say A =a9, was actually many outcomes: a81,a82, • • • •  ask· Unless 
the expert determines otherwise. the probabilit.ies for the unchanged outcomes are still 
valid under the new state of information. That is, 
P[A=ai IC(A),&'; = P[A=a; !C(A),Cf) i=;i:s (6) 
for ai in the set of unchanged outcomes of A. The conditional probabilities for the new 
outcomes can then be assessed directly, where 
k 
:EP[A=asi IC(A),t:{'; = P[A=a8jC(A),&) (7) 
for each combination of outcomes of the conditional predecessors of A. 
Just as for the ignored outcome ease, direet successors of a "split outcome" node 
do not have to have probabilities reassessed which are dependent on the unchanged out­
comes of A. Only probabilities conditioned on the new asi outcomes need be assessed. 
Thus the new distribution is given by 
P[A=ai IC(A.),Y] =P[A=ai IC(.4),&] i=;i:s and (8) 
� : �·. ·. ·. ·. ·. k II 1�¥11 (9) 
xe cr.4l 
k 
where L;>-.ij equals one for each combination Cj(A) of A's conditional predecessors. 
i•l 
Since A now has m +k-1 _outcomes t.he number of assessments required ( for the 
general case) is (m +k-2)Xn llcr.4 ill. When the split outcome case applies, this is 
reduced to (k-l)Xn IIC(A lll. 
Any direct successor (B) of A may not. nec�d all of its probabilities reassessed. If 
the the expert determines that the o1·iginal conditional probabilities for B, given out­
comes ai,i"'s of A, are still valid, then only t.he probabilities concerning A's new out­
comes must be assessed. If B hasp outcomes, and each variable in C (B)\A has n out­
comes, then for the general case ( m +k -l)X(p -l)XIIIIC(B)\AII probability assessments 
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are required. If the split outcome case applies, the number of assessments is reduced to 
kX(p -l)Xn IIC(B)\AII. . 
The graphs in Figures 2.a and 2.b show t-he effectiveness of the split outcomt> spe­
cial case relative to the general case. Similar to the graphs in Figure 1, these graphs 
show the ratio of the required number of a:o;sessments for the split outcome special case 
to those for the general case: k-l for Figure :2.a, and 
·� 
for Figure 2.b. Again, m+k-2 m+ ·-1 
notice the same type of effect from thE' relat.ive size of t.he increase in .4 : as k becomes 
large relative to m, the effectiveness of the special case decreases. 
1.0 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
0.0 L.-_ __,_ __ ..._ ____ ..__  __. 
0 10 20 
New Outcomes (k) 
.. 
... 
... 
..... 
a. Relative Effectiveness of Split 
Outcome Special Case for Node A 
m•2 
ma3 
m•4 
m-5 
1.0 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
0.2 
0.0 .__ __ _.__-JL..--_._ _ ___. 
0 10 20 
New Outcomes (k) 
b. Relative Effectiveness of Split 
Outcome Soecial Case for Node B 
Figure 2. Split Outcome Versus General Case Data Requirements 
When Splitting an Outcome of .4 Into k Outcomes 
If the variable A is added to an influence diagram, the number of probability 
assessments required to define A's distribution depends on the number of outcomes for 
A and the number of outcomes for each conditional predecessor of -A. Since there was 
previously no information in the diagram regarding A , all of these probabilities must be 
assessed. Additionally, the variables which now have A as a conditional predecessor 
must now have their distributions reassessed. One special case, the "assumed constant 
outcome" case, was identified. 
Assumecl Constant Outcome Special Ca�e. One way that the numbe1· of assess .. 
ments can be reduced is if the old state of information, &, is just the new state of infor­
mation with the added condition that A =a0. This might be the case when an expert 
learns that a factor previously considered constant did, in fact, have additional out- . 
comes. Part of the probabilities, for nodes which gain A as a conditional predecessor, 
would then transfer directly from the ot·iginal state of information to tht> new state of 
information. Suppose· B is a node with p outcomes that is conditioned on the newly 
added A . If this special case applies, 
P [B=bi lA =ao,C(B),&' ] = P [B=bi I C(B),&] j = 1, . . . , p (10) 
If each conditional predecessor (ot.her than A) of B has n outcomes, the number 
of assessments drops from kX(p-I)XniiCIBl\A II for t.he general case to 
(k-l)X(p -l)Xn IIC(B)\Ail for the special case. 
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The graphs in Figures 3.a and :l.b show the relative number of assessments 
required for the assumed constant. outcome special case. Since this special case does not 
reduce the required number of assessments to determine the probability distribution of 
the newly added variable, FigUJ·e :l.a shows t.hat. exactly the same number of probabili­
ties must be assessed (ratio= 1). Figure :3.b. like Figures 1 and 2, shows the decreas­
ing effectiveness of this special case as k bec·omes larger for any nodes which gain A as 
a conditional predecessor and for which the special case applies. The ratio for this 
h . . b 
k-1 grap IS g1ven y -k-. 
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Figure 3. Assumed Constant Outcome Versus General Case Data Requirements 
When Adding New Variable A 
Changes in Conditioning. When an arc is added between two nodes, sayfrom A to 
B, only B must have its probability distribution reassessed. Since the distribution for 
the predecessor node (A) is defined by the conditional predecessors of A , no changes 
must be made to A's distribution. The effect on B, however, is one seen earlier, in the 
discussion concerning changes in the numbe1· of variables. In fact, adding an arc can be 
viewed as a special case of adding a new variable. Thus the assumed constant outcome 
special case may also be applicable when adding a new arc between existing nodes. For 
B, the new direct successor of A, the situation is identical to that for a successor of a 
newly added node: if tQ.e original probability distribution of B is valid for one outcome 
of A, those values need not be gathered again. 
The Importance of Conditional Independence. The importance of getting the 
correct conditioning relationships in the intt uence diagram can not be overstat.ed. If 
valid relationships are left out, t.he domnin-specifie knowledge base will be incomplete, 
and the system may reach conclusions t.hat. differ greatly from the expert's. This would 
eventually lead to a maintenance <wtion t.o t'OJ'I'<•ct ·t.he discrepancy, much as rule-based 
systems are updated when they 1·each i-ncorrect. eonelusions. If unnecessary arcs are 
included in the diagram, the number of probabilities which must be assessed is unduly 
increased. The conclusions will be the same as t.hose reached using the diagram without 
the unnecessary arc, but more stl'ps (i.e., more computer resources) will be required to 
reach those conclusions. 
Summary 
Three special cases (ignored out.come. split outcome, and assumed constant out� 
come) point to situations where part or all of the marginal and conditional probabilities 
for nodes with changed incoming arcs can be used under the new state of information. 
Although these special cases do provide some decrease in the number of probability 
assessments which must be done to complete the modified influence diagram, their 
applicability must be determined, by the expert, for each change that is made. Since 
the number of required assessments, even when a special case applies, is exponential in 
the number of conditional predecessors to the node being reassessed, the selection of the 
minimum essential conditioning relationships Is much more important in keeping the 
number of assessments as low as possible. 
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